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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

•.

*

KENT WALTER BINGHAM,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950109-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are
provided in full at addendum A to this Brief:
United States Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1.
Utah Constitution, article I, § 24.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1310 (1993 Repl.)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3) (1995 Repl.)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953 as amended)
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
Point I:

Whether the prosecutor's use of peremptory

challenges to strike an African-American juror and Hispanic juror
violated equal protection under Article I, § 24 of the Utah
Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution.
Standard of Review - Mixed Question of Law and Fact
1

The standard of review adopted by this Court in State v.
Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah App. 1993), is one of a mixed
question of fact and law:
The trial court's conclusion as to whether or not a
prima facie case was established is a legal conclusion
which [this Court] will review for correctness,
according it no particular deference. [] The factual
findings of the trial court relevant to allegedly
discriminatory peremptory challenges merit deference on
appeal and will be set aside only if they are clearly
erroneous. [] This court, however, will review the
sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact for
correctness. (citations omitted)
Therefore, the trial court's underlying factual findings are
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, but its
determination on whether a prima facie case is shown and whether
the State has rebutted that prima facie case is reviewed for
correctness.

Id.

Under the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), and State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278
(Utah 1994), questions that are not pure fact or pure law issues
merit further discussion.

In Vincent, the court stated:

The basic teaching of our recent standard-of-review
cases is twofold. Findings of pure fact are uniquely
within the province of the trial court and will not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous. [] On the other
hand, the legal effect of those facts, or differently
phrased, their normative consequence, is the province
of the appellate courts, and no deference need be given
a trial court's resolution of such questions of law. []
Nevertheless, policy considerations may occasionally
lead us to define, as a matter of appellate court
grace, a legal standard so that it actually grants some
operational discretion to the trial courts applying it.
883 P.2d at 281-82 (citations omitted).

This rule was explained

in Pena using the "pasture11 metaphor proposed by Professor
2

Rosenberg in the context of a reasonable suspicion issue::
Returning to our earlier metaphor, the appellate court
reviews for correctness the placement of the legal
fences which delimit the pasture of trial court
discretion to determine what constitutes reasonable
suspicion. The decision when to create and where to
place these fences is an issue of law, and no deference
is accorded to the trial court. Not every case that
reaches an appellate court, however, must result in
establishment of a fence.
Id. at 939-40 n. 5.
The court delineated a number of factors to be used in
making that determination.

First, the court examines the

complexity and variety of the facts to which the legal standard
will be applied.

The greater the complexity and variety, the

greater the "likelihood that no rule can be spelled out that will
adequately address the relevance of all these facts to the legal
standard."

883 P.2d at 282. The second factor is the extent of

experience the appellate court has with particular fact
situations to which the legal rule will be applied.

"Third, the

more the application of a legal rule depends on facts that the
trial judge is uniquely able to evaluate, such as credibility,
the less the likelihood that an appellate court can effectively
review the application of the law to those facts on a cold
record."

Id.

The fourth and "countervailing factor" is the

"strength of the policy that the legal rule is designed to
vindicate and the need for uniformity in the application of that
policy in the trial courts."

Id. (emphasis added).

Applying the first factor, the complexity and variety of the
facts upon which courts must decide Batson type objections,
3

courts require the trial court to establish a detailed record for
appellate review.

Pharris. 846 P.2d at 459.

While some

deference must necessarily be given to any credibility
determinations, the facts underlying the jury selection are
easily reviewable.

The first factor therefore falls on the side

of a stricter Mde novo" review.
Appellate courts regularly review Batson challenges.
e.g..

See

State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994); State v.

Young. 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329
(Utah 1991); State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) ("Cantu
I"); State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II") ; State
v. Macial. 854 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1993); Pharris; State v.
Harris. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991).

Moreover, appellate

courts in Utah are well able to set a detailed legal standard for
Batson challenges.

Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 518-19 (adopting a

detailed list of factors to apply to Batson challenges).

The

second factor in Pena therefore also suggests a strict "de novo"
review.
Assuming the trial court ensures an adequate record as
required by Pharris. an appellate court can easily examine the
record and apply the legal rules for peremptory challenges.

As

such, the third Pena factor strongly suggests "de novo" review.
Finally, the strength of the rule against discrimination
during peremptory challenges is strong and requires uniformity in
its application.

Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct.

1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (emphasizing the strong policy against
4

discrimination in judicial proceedings).

As all four Pena

factors fall on the side of Mde novo" review, this court should
adopt a correction of error standard of review that allows little
deference to the trial court's ultimate determinations of whether
a prima facie case of discrimination was established and whether
the State provided a legitimate race neutral explanation
rebutting the prima facie case.
Preservation of The Issue for Review
The issue was preserved by defense counsel's timely
objection to the peremptory challenges of Mr. Sampson and Ms.
Gonzales, on the basis that they were racially motivated, citing
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69
(1986), Cantu I. and Cantu II. as support.

R. 230. As discussed

in Point I below, Cantu II adopted a test for Batson type
challenges under Utah equal protection which is independent from
federal equal protection law.

The trial court overruled the

objection, finding a race neutral reason for the peremptory
challenges.

R. 233-34.

Point II: Whether the prosecutor1s misstatement of the law
concerning unlawful control over a motor vehicle probably
influenced the jury and denied Mr. Bingham his constitutional
right to a fair trial.
Standard of Review —

Correctness

This Court reviews whether a prosecutor misstated the law
during argument and whether the misstatement probably influenced
the jury as a question of law, affording no deference to the
5

trial court's determination.

State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 554-

55 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (1993); State v.
Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1990).
Preservation of Issue for Review
This issue was preserved by counsel's immediate objection to
the State's alleged mischaracterization of the law.
court overruled the objection.

The trial

R. 352-53.

Point III: Whether Mr. Bingham's constitutional right to be
tried with a presumption of innocence was denied by the trial
court's denial of his motion for mistrial when during jury
selection, a potential juror discussed having seen Mr. Bingham
appear before a different court in jail clothes.
Standard of Review —

Correctness

The question of whether a defendant's rights to a fair trial
are infringed by jury influence from observing a defendant in
jail clothes or shackles has been reviewed by this court as a
matter of law and have accorded no deference to the trial court's
conclusions.

State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993); Chess

v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980).
Preservation of Issue for Review
The issue was preserved by defense counsel's timely motion
for a mistrial, made during jury selection on the basis that the
jury was influenced by statements from a prospective juror, Ms.
DeRosier, that she had recently seen Mr. Bingham in jail clothes
appearing before another court.
motion.

The trial court denied the

R. 234-236.
6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Bingham was charged by information on September 29,
1994, with one count of Theft By Receiving Stolen Property, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953 as amended), a
Second Degree Felony, and one count of Unlawful Possession Of
Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-5
(1953 as amended), a class B misdemeanor.

R. 8-10.

Upon a trial

by jury, Mr. Bingham was found guilty on both counts. R. 150-51.
The trial court sentenced Mr. Bingham on count I, Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property, to a term of one to fifteen years at
the Utah State Prison, a fine of $5000 and a surcharge of $4250.
R. 156. On count II, Mr. Bingham was sentenced concurrently to
six months in jail, a fine of $500 and a surcharge of $425.
157.

R.

Mr. Bingham filed a timely notice of appeal on February 6,

1995.

R. 161-62.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1

A.

Jury Selection

During jury selection, in response to a question from the
trial judge, Ms. DeRosier, a potential juror, described for the
entire jury venire an incident where she had seen the defendant a
few weeks earlier as he was appearing before another court for a
"pretrial":
Judge Young: Thank you. Are any of you acquainted with Mr.
Mauro [counsel for Mr. Bingham] or Mr. Bingham, if so, would you
raise your hand?
Mr. Bingham does contest his conviction of count II,
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and therefore recites
only the facts relevant to count I.
7

There appears to be no affirmative response.
Oh, yes, Ma'am. You are Ms. DeRosier. With whom are you
acquainted?
Ms. DeRosier: I just saw Mr. Bingham at like a pre-trial a
couple of weeks ago out in West Valley. I was just there in the
courtroom.
Judge Young:
Ms. DeRosier:

And are your acquainted with him in any way?
No, I just—

Judge Young: Just by coincidence you saw him, perhaps, in a
proceeding relating to this, only an earlier proceeding; is that
correct?
Ms. DeRosier: Well, I don't know whether it is related to
this case or not. It's where they go up and ask whether you're
guilty or not guilty. He had a pre-trial.
Judge Young: It's probably an arraignment. And so an
earlier proceeding. It's curious to me, that among the many
people whom you would see there, why you would remember Mr.
Bingham. Can you tell us how it is that you remember one person
out of that group? Are you acquainted with Mr. Bingham?
Ms. DeRosier:
his face.
Judge Young:

H, Huh-uh.

Not at all.

R. 198-200.
bench.

I just remember

You remember his face?

Ms. DeRosier: He was dressed in —
of 'em overnight in jail.
Judge Young:

No.

I guess they kept a few

Uh-huh.

In response, defense counsel asked to approach the

At the conclusion of the bench conference, the trial

court gave the prospective jurors the following instruction:
Occasionally, During the course of a trial, courts will
have a request made of the court to make a conference
at the sidebar. That conference is normally not on the
record, however, at the request of the parties, the
court will reserve their right to make a record of the
discussion at the sidebar.
In relation to that discussion I will simply tell
you that there were concerns that were raised regarding
the response of Ms. DeRosier in relation to having seen
Mr. Bingham previously in artother court. Let me
8

explain to all of you as jurors that before, well
before a matter comes to trial a defendant accused of
an offense is arrested, is brought before the circuit
court for, initially, an arraignment, they may well be
in custody at the time that they are brought before
that court, they may well be in jail apparel at the
time they are brought before that court. They may well
have spent a night in the county jail. That is not
exactly the best groomery for someone to look their
best as they might come to court the following morning.
None of those events could be presumed by anyone to
relate to whether or not they committed the crime.
Whether or not is redundant, but whether they committed
the crime. And it would be very likely that Mr.
Bingham's proceedings, observed by Ms. DeRosier, were
entirely related solely to this case and none of you
could presume that it would be related to anything
else. It could have been, but for the purposes of this
case you may certainly not assume that it was, it was
simply related to this case. We don't accuse someone
of a crime and then convict 'em on the basis of a
coincidental appearance in a prior court. The crime is
based upon the facts of the case.
If there is anyone who would be inclined to
consider Mr. Bingham is in any way jeopardized by the
fact that Ms[.] DeRosier states that she likely saw him
before in another court in a prior proceeding, would
you raise your hand?
There appears to be no affirmative response to
that.
R. 201-02.
Defense counsel requested a mistrial on the grounds that Ms.
DeRosier had announced to the prospective jurors that she had
seen Mr. Bingham at a prior proceeding, in jail clothes, and that
the jury would be effected by that.
denied the motion for mistrial.

R. 234-36.

The trial judge

R. 236.

Defense counsel also objected to the State's use of two
peremptory challenges to strike an African-American juror and a
Hispanic juror, on the basis that the were racially motivated.
Defense counsel cited cases in support of its objections: Batson
v. Kentucky and the two State v. Cantu cases from the Utah
9

Supreme Court.2

R. 230. The prosecutor offered an explanation

for the strikes which he claimed were not related to any racial
motivation.

R. 231-33. As for Mr. Sampson, who the State agreed

was African-American, the State claimed to have struck him due to
his stated concerns over his new employment and that jury service
would be a hardship.

R. 231. The State claimed to have struck

Ms. Gonzales, a Hispanic person, due to her lack of post high
school education and employment in food service.

R. 231-32. The

prosecutor claimed that because of the nature of the case, he
believed better educated jurors would more easily grasp the legal
concepts involved.

The prosecutor also cited his observation

that Ms. Gonzales' answers were "a bit slow and halting, . . . ."
Id.
The trial judge ruled:
I find that the exercise of the challenge has been race
neutral. The Defendant in this case is Anglo. We
don't have a defendant that is racially different than
the total panel of the jury and the court finds that
the explanation of the State in relation to the two
jurors, Sampson and Gonzales, has been adequate and
that they are entitled to exercise their challenges on
that basis.
R. 234.
B.

Evidence Adduced at Trial

On September 25, 1994, between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m., Jackie
Redmon drove her vehicle to the Corner Stop Express, located at
2

The transcript of the jury selection proceedings actually
portrays counsel's citations as "Madsen v. Kentucky" and "the two,
State v. Kent, two cases." As the United States Supreme court case
Batson v. Kentucky, and the two State v. Cantu cases in Utah are
well known and oft cited, counsel's citations were apparently
incorrectly transcribed.
10

4790 West 3500 South, parked and went inside, leaving the keys in
the ignition.

R. 250-51. After being inside for a few minutes,

Ms. Redmon returned to find her vehicle missing.

R. 252.

At approximately 1:50 a.m. the next morning, September 26,
1994, Officer Shaffnit of the West Jordan Police Department
spotted a vehicle driving erratically.

As he followed the

vehicle, it turned into a parking lot, a female passenger exited
the vehicle and appeared to be upset.

The vehicle parked in a

stall, and in the process, bumped another vehicle with the
passenger door.

Officer Shaffnit stopped the vehicle and

confronted the driver, who he identified at trial as Mr. Bingham.
Officer Shaffnit testified that Mr. Bingham appeared to be
"disoriented, confused and had a hard time understanding
questions and orders." R. 259-63. Upon conducting a computer
check of the vehicle, Officer Shaffnit determined it had been
stolen and arrested Mr. Bingham.

R. 264.

Officer Hales, also from the West Jordan Police Department,
assisted Officer Shaffnit with the incident.

Officer Hales

testified that he was called to go to a location at approximately
6885 South 1700 West.

Upon arriving at the location, Officer

Hales conducted a computer check of the license plate on the
vehicle.

The license plate was an Idaho license plate and when

checked, did not correspond to the vehicle.

R. 271-74.

During a

search of the vehicle, Officer Hales found a Utah License plate
in the front seat which corresponded to the subject vehicle.
282.
11

R.

Ms. Redmon was called to the scene at approximately 2:00
a.m. and identified her vehicle.

Ms. Redmon testified that she

noticed that a "Z93 sticker" which was on her vehicle had been
covered with some gold tape and a "skull sticker." R. 252-53.
She also testified that a number of personal items, her car
stereo and speakers were missing.

Jd.

Ms. Redmon testified that

she did not inform Officer Hales or Shaffnit of the missing
items.

R. 297-98.

At the close of the State's evidence, defense counsel made a
motion arguing that the evidence presented was not sufficient to
prove the elements of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, and
instead, only satisfied the elements of Unlawful Control of a
Vehicle, a lesser included offense.

Specifically, counsel argued

that the evidence only proved an intent to "temporarily deprive"
Ms. Redmon of her vehicle.

The trial court denied the motion.

R. 300-306.
Mr. Bingham testified, admitting that he was a heroin addict
and was suffering from withdrawals on the day Ms. Redmon's
vehicle went missing.

Mr. Bingham's vehicle had broken down and

he was attempting to call a friend to pick him up from the
telephone located at the same convenience store at which Ms.
Redmon was parked.

A female friend with Mr. Bingham saw that the

keys were left in the vehicle in question and mentioned that fact
to Mr. Bingham.

Mr. Bingham and the female passenger then took

the vehicle, intending to go to Pioneer Park and obtain some
drugs.

R. 313-322.
12

Mr. Bingham testified that he took the license plate off of
Ms. Redmon's vehicle and put on the Idaho plate from his broken
down car.

He testified that he did this in order to avoid being

identified and arrested when he went to Pioneer Park.

He

testified that he covered the lfZ93 sticker11 for the same reason.
Mr. Bingham went to Pioneer Park and purchased heroin, then went
to an apartment where he was staying at "4Oth West and 5300
South."

Upon arriving at the apartment, he injected some heroin

and then attempted to drive his female friend to her home in
Sugarhouse.

R. 324-29. Mr. Bingham was pulled over and arrested

while taking her home.

He testified that it was his intention to

abandon the vehicle close to where he was living after taking her
home.

R. 329.

C.

Closing Argument

During Closing argument, the prosecutor made the following
statement regarding the difference between Receiving Stolen
Property, and the lesser included offense of Unlawful Control
Over a Motor Vehicle:
Now the joy-riding, which Mr. Bingham has basically
admitted to, in fact, he has admitted to it, he told
you that he intended to return that car—not return it,
he was going to abandon it. So the element there, that
on September the 25th, Kent Walter Bingham, exercised
unauthorized control over a motor vehicle not his own,
while in Salt Lake County. Absolutely. You heard him
say that.
. . . .

But that's where he wants you to stop and that's
where the people of the State of Utah don't want you to
stop. We want you to look at No. 18 and come back with
a verdict of guilty because he intended to deprive the
owner of that motor vehicle. Why? How? First of all,
as you heard me just explain, unlawful control over a
motor vehicle in the legal jargon is called joy-riding.
13

Joy-riding is where# generally, a couple of kids see a
motor vehicle, many cases just like this, at a
convenience store, somebody's run in, left the motor
running, the key's in there, they grab it, they drive
over to a friend's house, they ride around town for a
little bit and they abandon it within a 24-hour period.
R. 351-52.

Defense counsel immediately objected to the statement

as being an incorrect statement of the law.

R. 352.

The trial

court overruled defense counsel's objection:
Well, he's arguing the application of those
instructions. The objection's overruled. You can deal
with that in your rebuttal argument.
R. 352-53.
During the jury's deliberation, the jury sent the following
hand-written note to the court:
Clarify
(1) Is "permanent" [greater than or equal to] 24 hours?
(2) how long is "extended period of time"?
R. 146.

The trial judge sent the following hand-written note

back in response:
You will have to rely on your best judgment & the
instructions in the law.
I

l

S
Is
I

David S. Young
R. 146.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State conceded that Mr. Bingham had established a prima
facie case that peremptory challenges used by the State to strike
an African-American and Hispanic juror were racially motivated.
Utah has established law under equal protection applicable

14

to Batson challenges which is independent from federal equal
protection analysis.

Examined under the factors delineated in

Cantu II, the State's explanation failed to rebut the prima facie
case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.

Since no

harmless error analysis is applicable, this Court should grant
Mr. Bingham a new trial.
During closing argument, the prosecutor misstated the law
regarding the lesser included offense of unlawful control over a
motor vehicle.

The jury's note to the trial court during

deliberation showed the probable influence which the misstatement
had on the jury.

Mr. Bingham was therefore denied the right to a

fair trial and should be granted a new trial.
During jury selection, a potential juror disclosed to the
entire venire that she had recently seen Mr. Bingham in jail
clothes as he appeared before another court.

The trial court's

denial of Mr. Bingham's motion for a mistrial denied Mr. Bingham
his right to be tried with the presumption of innocence
constitutionally required under Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE'S USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO STRIKE TWO
MINORITY JURORS VIOLATED EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE I, S
24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

A.
The State Conceded that Mr. Bingham Had Met His Burden
of Shoving a Prima Facie Case
Using a peremptory challenge to strike a juror based upon
that juror's race violates equal protection.
15

Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79 (1986); State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989)
f"Cantu 11").

In order to attack the State's peremptory

challenge, Mr. Bingham must first establish a prima facie case.
"The burden then shifts to the [State] to show the existence of a
racially neutral reason for the challenge."

Cantu II. 778 P.2d

at 518. The Utah Supreme Court has listed the elements necessary
in establishing a prima facie case as the following:
(1) as complete a record as possible, (2) a showing
that persons excluded belong to a cognizable group . .
. and (3) a showing that there exists "a strong
likelihood that such persons are being challenged
because of their group association rather than because
of any specific bias."
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994).

The court noted

that evidence that the State has struck most or all of the
members of a minority group may be sufficient to make out a prima
facie case.

Id. at 457.

In Mr. Bingham's case, however, the state failed to contest
Mr. Bingham's establishment of a prima facie case and therefore
this Court should presume that the defendant satisfied his burden
and should examine the State's alleged race-neutral explanation.
State v. Macial. 854 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1993) (court will
presume a prima facie case if State fails to contest it). In
fact, the State agreed that Mr. Bingham had demonstrated a prima
facie case.

In making Mr. Bingham's objection to the State's use

of peremptory challenges, defense counsel stated:
I think we've met the threshold showing that these
people are minority members of the jury panel, they
have been struck by the State on peremptory challenge.
I think the burden then shifts to the State to show
there is a race neutral explanation for striking Juror
16
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No,

-

Sampson,

Juror

"

""
i

]
reasons [

;

Gonzales.
*v~ -~ 7p neutral

he State . , n e g e a i

Young presumably agreed as wel], ruling only that the exercise of
1,1M.!

peremploj j i.lllli nil U'i'ifie'i < hv\

" "' -?**

ivn

'" Since

the State failed to contest the matter, agreeing m a t tnex
prima * -ie case, and the trial court implicitly agreed -*Ltiitii C; ...

-

is demonstrated and

examine the State's asserted reasons for stinking the jurors.
B.
Examination of the State's Explanation Under Utah Equal
Protection Law Demonstrates that It Was Pretextual in Nature and
Not Race Neutral
The equal protection, clause i n the fourteenth amendment
I'm *

i i;iPr".:

Section 1. [Citizenship
protection.]

E

,,:l B j, r o

c € siS

,: f j a ( , ,

E

^ ua j

All persons born or n a turalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
(I

i uiause is found in

3

Where no findings appear I n the record, the court assumes
the trial court found them in accordance with its decision, state
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991).
The trial court's findings regarding the legitimacy of the
prosecutor's proffered explanation, however, is a more difficult
matter considering this Court's requirements in Pharris, 846 P.2d
at 464-65, that a trial court make specific findings using the
cri teria set out I n Cantu II.
17

Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution and provides:
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.
In Malan v. Lewis, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that
the equal protection clause under the Utah Constitution differed
in language from that found in the fourteenth amendment.
P.2d 661# 670 (Utah 1984).

693

While the court found that the Utah

Constitution incorporates the same general principles as the
equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment, the court
stated:
The different language of Article I, § 24, the
different constitutional contexts of the two
provisions, and different jurisprudential
considerations may lead to a different result in
applying equal protection principles under Article I, §
24 than might be reached under federal law.
693 P.2d at 670. The Malan court proceeded to find that Utah law
had set a more restrictive standard when determining whether a
statute was constitutional on equal protection grounds.
670-71.

Id. at

Accord Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d

816 (Utah 1991) (applying separate equal protection analysis
under the Utah Constitution). This independent state
constitutional analysis was most recently applied by the Utah
Supreme Court in State of Utah v. Asipeli Mohi. No. 940028,
940200, 940201, Slip op. (Utah Supreme Court, June 15, 1995)
(relying on Article I, § 24 and its independent equal protection
analysis to invalidate the direct file provision in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-25).
In Batson, the Supreme Court, relying on the equal
18

protection clause in the fourteenth amendment, required that -'order

i • | i. iniii •

challenge must explain,

party exercising the
clear, reasonably specific manner,

legitimate, neutral reasons for his or liner challenges that are
related

.

• 11

Pharris. 846 P.2d 4 A

1 \

' State v .,

• (Utah App. 1993)1 (emphasis in

oriqinai) (citing, Batson. 476 U.S. at 9<i n

Mil)

in the recent

case, Purkett. Superintendent, fcdimiiiulun Corrections Center y»
Elem,

l

i

Cr im, III.. R e p . (BNA) 3044 „ (IJ. S. S u p r e m e C o u r t C a s e N o .

(-1 p., I'm, ]

'Per Curiam), the United States Supreme

Court further explained the fedex all Ill a i i aj: | Ill :1 cab] c 1: .• ::: • Batson t .ype
challenges.

The Court explained the steps under Batson;

[0]nce the 0 p p 0 n e n t ol d peremptory challenge has made
out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step
1 ) , the burden of production shifts to the proponent of
the strike to come forward with a race-neutral
explanation (step 2 ) , If a race-neutral explanation is
tendered, the trial court must then decide (step 3)
whether the opponent of the strike has proved
purposeful racial discrimination
[]
The second step of this process does i lot demand an
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. "At
this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the
facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation.
Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed race neutral." [quoting, Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)]
Elem at 3044,
In "i
developed

ii11 Batson Ivypc? clia I I ,,i
independent analysis upon equal

varying from federal equal protection law
respects.
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grounds,

significant

challenge, the Utah Supreme Court, in Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 51819, adopted additional "criteria by which to judge the adequacy
of a party's explanation of an allegedly racially motivated
peremptory challenge."

Pharris. 846 P.2d at 463.

In adopting the additional criteria, the court listed
factors which may "'cast doubt upon the legitimacy of a
purportedly race-neutral explanation' because they 'tend to show
that the state's reasons are not actually supported by the record
or are an impermissible pretext' . . . "
329, 342 (Utah 1991).

State v. Span. 819 P.2d

Those factors include:

(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the
juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or
perfunctory examination, assuming neither the trial
court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror,
(3) singling the juror out for special questioning
designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the
prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the
case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally
applicable to juror[s] who were not challenged.
Span. 819 P.2d at 342-43.

In addition, the Cantu II court

explained that after establishing a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the State to provide race neutral reasons for the
contested peremptory challenges that are related to the case.
778 P.2d at 518.

If the State cannot meet its burden of

establishing a viable race-neutral reason for either of the
peremptory challenges, then Mr. Bingham's conviction must be
reversed "without regard to the harmlessness of the
constitutional error."

Pharris. 846 P.2d at 459.

In the present case, the State's explanation for striking
Ms. Gonzales was:
20

M s . G o n z a l e s , b e c a u s e of t h e n a t u r e of t h i s c a s e , t h e
n a t u r e of t h e f t b y r e c e i v i n g , t h e c o n c e p t of t h e f t b y
r e c e i v i n g , h i s t o r i c a l l y a p p e a r s for p r o s e c u t o r s t o b e a
d i f f i c u l t t h i n g t o e x p l a i n t o t h e jury, t h e c o n c e p t is
d i f f i c u l t for s o m e of them t o g r a s p . A n d t h e S t a t e
believes that jurors who are better educated can
u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e a s o n s t h a t t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t s for
concerning reasonable d o u b t — o r negating reasonable
d o u b t and e x p l a i n i n g t h e c o n c e p t .
It g o e s o v e r t h e
e l e m e n t s of t h e jury i n s t r u c t i o n .
M s . Gonzales, and
t h i s is in n o w a y is t o infer t h a t p e o p l e w h o a r e n o t
w e l l e d u c a t e d or a p p e a r t o b e b r i g h t e r , c a n n o t s e r v e o n
j u r i e s , b u t t h i s is a l i t t l e b i t m o r e of a t e c h n i c a l
c a s e . S h e h a s a h i g h school e d u c a t i o n .
She w o r k s in
food s e r v i c e .
I b e l i e v e , for a school
[Response b y J u d g e Y o u n g ] : J o r d a n .
[State c o n t i n u e s ] : A n d h e r a n s w e r s w e r e a b i t s l o w and
h a l t i n g , h e r s p e e c h p a t t e r n seemed t o b e t h a t s h e h a d
t o t h i n k about t h i n g s a little b i t and t h e S t a t e w a s
c o n c e r n e d w h e t h e r she w o u l d b e a b l e t o g r a s p w h a t t h e
S t a t e is g o i n g t o p r e s e n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y c l o s i n g
arguments. Again, race neutral reasons.
R. 2 3 1 - 3 2 ,

D e f e n s e counsel

responded.

W e l l , I w o u l d just d i s p u t e that t h e o n e , c e r t a i n l y w i t h
M s . G o n z a l e s , on w h e t h e r e d u c a t i o n p l a y s a r o l e .
There
a r e a n u m b e r of o t h e r j u r o r s t h a t h a v e b e e n s e l e c t e d
t h a t h a v e only h i g h school e d u c a t i o n s . A n d it w o u l d
l o o k like M s . K a v e l i k , J u r o r N o . 2, M r . F o w l k s , J u r o r
N o . 7, M s . D a v i e , J u r o r N o . 1 8 , M s . I n c e , J u r o r N o . 2 1 .
A n d t h a t ' s t h e jury p a n e l as it s t a n d s r i g h t n o w .
The

furthe r ex,p 1 a i ned:

I was going to explain the different jobs they had with
t h e i r h i g h school e d u c a t i o n .
If t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e
h i g h school e d u c a t i o n , t h e job, w h i c h M s . G o n z a l e s h a s ,
and t h e m o s t important factor is t h e S t a t e ' s p e r c e p t i o n
of h e r m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s as she p e r c e i v e d t h e q u e s t i o n s
and m a n n e r she a n s w e r e d them.
R

23 3.
A s for M r , Sampson, t h e S t a t e ' s p r o f f e r e d r e a s o n w a s t h a t h e

>^i stated

-

o n c e r n o v e r h i s new employment

(h , ."08-2 09) and t h e
w>'«"" |«,rd

commission

The S t a t e t h e r e f o r e

.

concerned that Mr.

' * "i*,"t
Sampson

would worry more about his job than the case.

R. 231.

Additionally, The State was concerned that Mr. Sampson had stated
that he knew Andrew Valdez and Richard Uday (R. 223) at the Salt
Lake Legal Defenders office.

R. 231. The trial judge ruled:

All right. Well, I've heard your arguments in respect
to each. I find that the exercise of the challenge has
been race neutral. The defendant in this case is
Anglo. We don't have a defendant that is racially
different than the total panel of the jury and the
court finds that the explanation of the State in
relation to the two jurors, Sampson and Gonzales, has
been adequate and that they are entitled to exercise
their challenges on that basis.
R. 233-34.
Even one single challenge based upon discrimination
constitutes a violation of equal protection.
at 465.

Pharris, 846 P.2d

It should be noted at the outset that the trial court's

finding, here, that Mr. Bingham was anglo misapplied the law.

Id

(trial court's finding that defendant was not of the same
minority race as the challenged juror was misplaced) . This Court
explained in State v. Span that a person of any race may make a
Batson challenge regardless of whether the defendant is a
minority, so long as the subject juror is within a "cognizable
racial group."

819 P.2d 329, 339-41 (Utah 1991) (holding that

Powers v. Ohio. Ill S.Ct. 1364 (1991) had "clearly eliminated any
standing requirement" to challenge discriminatory use of a
peremptory challenge).

Therefore, the district court's finding

that Mr. Bingham is not of a minority race is irrelevant and
misplaced.
Applying the factors adopted in Cantu II to the State's
22

explanation for striking Ms. Gonzales,
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response, Ms. Gonzalez stated:
My n a m e ' s J udy G o n z a l e s ,

i have j

IIUJII

school

education. I'm married. I work for Jordan School
District in the food service department
And I have
two children and five grandchildren.
lonzales also responded to tl le tr lal judge's Inquiry
into prior jury servi ce of the potenti.r. -;.rors.
response was
been about

Her total
s

years ago."

uu the trial judge'

,

.wu^aies also responded

inquire <"•* whethe; .

potential juror had

been
broken into "a month ago
-uestions
T iiistor,
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rosecutor asked
'' **

n&r responsi
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information regarding

anything that would reasonably enlighten the State as to her
ability to understand legal concepts.

R. 228.

Indeed, the State

asked no questions of any of the venire members.
As discussed below, since others that ultimately served on
the jury had only high school educations, the State's reliance on
Ms. Gonzales' brief statement becomes even more suspect.

If the

State was indeed concerned about her education and skills, it did
not attempt to alleviate those concerns through any questions of
her or others with only high school educations.

The second

factor, therefore, further indicates that the State's proffered
explanation was a pretext.
The third factor is whether the prospective juror was
singled out for questioning to evoke a certain response.

This

factor does not apply either way in this case since the
prosecutor asked no questions whatsoever of any of the jurors.
The fourth factor, whether the prospective juror was
challenged for a reason unrelated to the trial, again shows that
the State's proffered reason was merely a pretext.

Contrary to

the prosecutor's suggestion, this case was a very simple one.
The only real question the jury had to decide was whether the
evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bingham
intended to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle, or
whether it showed only that he had taken the vehicle temporarily.
The evidence presented was brief and simple witness testimony,
and included no complex factual situations or legal argument.
The prosecutor's explanation, therefore, was not related to this
24

specific case and further exposes the pretextual nature of the
perempt or y lA" r i lint""
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inherently

essence, the State argued that minorities
*

than non-minorities - ..: high school educations.

.in ,. jurors
Such inherent

and indirect discrimination was proscribed in Cantu II and cannot
be a race neutral reason.

778 P.2d at 518-19 (court found that

State's explanation, that hispanic juror was stricken because
prosecutor was angry with defense for insisting on the inclusion
of the juror, was not race neutral or legitimate).
The examination of the factors above leads to the conclusion
that the State's proposed explanation was merely a pretext and
could not rebut Mr. Bingham's prima facie case.

As no

"legitimate11 race-neutral reason to strike Ms. Gonzales was
given, and based upon the trial court's misapplication of the
law, finding that Mr. Bingham was not a minority, the trial court
erred in concluding that the prosecutor had given a race neutral
reason and Mr. Bingham is entitled to a new trial.
Applying the same factors to the State's explanation for
striking Mr. Sampson, for the same reasons discussed in regard to
Ms. Gonzales, the first and third factors do not apply.

The

second factor, "failure to examine the juror or perfunctory
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing
counsel had questioned the juror," again supports Mr. Bingham's
position that the State's proposed explanation was merely a
pretext.

It should first be noted that the record shows no

attempt on the part of the State to have Mr. Sampson excused for
cause.

The State asked no follow-up questions of Mr. Sampson and

apparently determined that there was no for-cause reason to
excuse Mr. Sampson.

Since the State used its peremptory to

strike Mr. Sampson, another minority, without attempting to have
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the court excuse him for cause,

asking any questions of M r .
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regarding her concerns.
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striking Mr. Sampson.
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Mr. Bingham should therefore receive a new t. rial.
<-'•
Under the Federal Constitutional Standard. M r . Bingham
has Proved that the State's Explanation Was Not Race Neutral.
Bingham has also carried his burden *** -howing racial
discrimination under the federal equal pre
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discussed above, the State's explanation for striking Ms.
Gonzales could have applied to three other non minority jurors
who ultimately served on the jury.

Moreover, because of the

simple nature of the case and the evidence presented, it was
disingenuous for the State to characterize it as complex and
needing well educated jurors.
Most important, in the proffered explanation, the prosecutor
essentially explained that a hispanic woman with only a high
school education did not have the mental ability to be a juror in
this case, while non-minority jurors with only a high school
education did.

This explanation was inherently discriminatory

and therefore could not be a "legitimate" reason under Batson.
Therefore, Mr. Bingham met his burden of showing discrimination
under the federal equal protection standards as well and should
receive a new trial.
II.

THE PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW DURING CLOSING
ARGUMENT VIOLATED MR. BINGHAM'S RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL AND
MERITS REVERSAL
In State v. Trov. the Utah Supreme Court delineated the test

to be used to determine whether a prosecutor's misconduct has
deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
1984).

688 P.2d 483 (Utah

That test was applied by this Court in the context of a

prosecutor's misstatement of the law during closing argument:
The test to determine whether a prosecutor's remarks
have deprived a defendant of a fair trial and merit
reversal in a criminal case is "did the remarks call to
the attention of the jurors matters which they would
not be justified in considering in determining their
verdict, and were they, under the circumstances of the
particular case, probably influenced by those remarks."
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State v , Bovatt.854 P.2d 550 r 554-55 (Utah i\pp, ) , cert, denied.
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c ] osi i lg argument, the prosecutor made the following statement:
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called joy-riding. Joy-riding is where, generally, a
couple of kids see a motor vehicle, many cases just
like this, at a convenience store, somebody's run in,
left the motor running, the key's in there, they grab
it, they drive over to a friend's house, they ride
around town for a little bit and they abandon it within
a 24-hour perioc
I

I

i"

f em**

. ,",

.,il. i.vtfrl

prosecutor's characterization oi the law.

Id.

f-he '""

The court ruled:

Well, he's arguing the application
of those
instructions. The objection # s overruled. You can deal
with '•"hat in your rebuttal argument.
P . 3F * -Di.

Contrary to the trial judge's ruling, the prosecute
misstated!
part:

I In> I

>

I c c t 11 in

II I i

1early
t

(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to
exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the
consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with
intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful
custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer,
or semitrailer.
The only real distinction therefore from receiving stolen
property is that the actor intends to deprive the owner of the
vehicle "temporarily."4

More importantly, there is no mention

of 24 hours in either statute.

It was the jury, and not the

prosecutor who was to determine whether the intention was to
deprive temporarily or permanently.

The prosecutor suggested

that there was a 24 hour period involved.

The prosecutor's

misstatement therefore confused the very question the jury was to
decide.
The prosecutor also told the jury that in "legal jargon" it
is called "joy-riding."

The prosecutor then attempted to limit

the statute to a common childhood or teen-age prank, again
mischaracterizing the law and confusing the jury.

Therefore, the

first prong of the Troy test was met.
Having shown that the prosecutor's remarks were improper,
Mr. Bingham must show that the misleading statements probably
4

The Receiving Stolen Property statute requires that the
defendant have an intent to "deprive." § 76-6-408(1). "Purpose to
deprive" is defined in pertinent part in § 76-6-401(3) as:
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious
obj ect:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for
so extended a period or to use under
circumstances that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or of the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost; or
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influenced the jury.

Trov 688 P.2d at 486.

In evaluating the

effect of the improper statements, the court should look at the
circumstances of the case as a whole, which includes an
examination of the strength of the evidence against the
defendant.

Id.

The State's proposed evidence upon which it relied to prove
that Mr. Bingham intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle for
more than a temporary basis was that Mr. Bingham had changed the
license plate on the vehicle, and that he had covered a sticker
on the vehicle.

Mr. Bingham testified, giving reasons for both

changing the license plate and covering the sticker.

Under these

circumstances, it cannot be said that the evidence of Mr.
Bingham's guilt was overwhelming and this Court should closely
scrutinize the prosecutor's misconduct.

Troy. 688 P.2d at 486.

More important, during the jury's deliberation, the jury
sent the following hand-written note to the court:
Clarify
(1) Is "permanent" [greater than or equal to sign] 24
hours?
(2) how long is "extended period of time"?
R. 146.

The trial judge sent the following hand-written note

back in response:
You will have to rely on your best judgment & the
instructions in the law.
ISI
II

David S. Young
R. 146.

The jury's note demonstrated the difficulty which the
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jury had with the temporary/permanent distinction and suggests
the jury was confused by the prosecutor's statement that "joyriding" persons abandon the vehicle within 24 hours.
The prosecutor's misstatement confused the law applicable to
the crucial factual question in Mr. Bingham's case; whether he
intended to keep the vehicle only temporarily.

In the

circumstances of Mr. Bingham's case, even a small degree of
influence could have swayed the jury.

See Troy, 688 P.2d at 486.

Finally, the trial court did not provide a curative
instruction to the jury, See State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 300
Utah 1988), and in fact, implied that the prosecutor was correct.
Rather than sustaining the objection and instructing the jury to
disregard the characterization and look only at the elements
stated in the jury instruction, the trial court assisted the
State in its erroneous characterization by condoning the
statement and implying that it was correct.

The second prong of

the Troy test is therefore met and Mr. Bingham should receive a
new trial.
III. DISCUSSION BEFORE ENTIRE JURY VENIRE. REGARDING JUROR'S
EXPOSURE TO MR. BINGHAM WHILE IN JAIL CLOTHES AND BEFORE
ANOTHER COURT. DENIED MR. BINGHAM HIS RIGHT TO BE TRIED WITH
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
It is well established that a defendant should not be
compelled to appear at trial in jail clothing.

Chess v. Smith.

617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980).

That right is a fundamental right of

constitutional magnitude.

Id. at 344-45 (citing, Estelle v.

Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)).
The rule is based upon the fundamental right of a defendant to be
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tried with the presumption of innocence.

425 U.S. at 503. As

recognized by this Court:
Further, "[t]he presumption of innocence, although not
articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component
of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice."
[quoting, Estelle, 425 U.S. at 501] It necessarily
follows from this that a criminal defendant is
generally entitled to the "physical indicia of
innocence." [citing, Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d
101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973), cert, denied. Kennedy v.
Gray. 416 U.S. 959 (1974)] This indicia of innocence
most often refers to the right of a criminal defendant
to be tried in front of a jury in the "garb of
innocence," rather than in prison clothing. [quoting,
Kennedy. at 105. "The prejudicial effect that flows
from a defendants appearing before a jury in
identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it is
so potentially prejudicial as to create a substantial
risk of fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial."
[quoting, Chess. 617 P.2d at 344]
State v. Mitchell. 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App. 1991).

This

principle has been extended to a give the defendant a qualified
right to appear in front of a jury without shackles or chains.
Id.
The question in Mr. Bingham's case is to what extent a
defendant's fair trial rights require that he not be tried by a
jury which has heard another juror relate her experience that she
saw Mr. Bingham before another court, possibly on another case,
and in jail clothes.

The Utah Supreme Court has addressed a

similar issue in the context of a juror who saw the defendant in
handcuffs one morning before trial.
(Utah 1993).

State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64

With relatively little analysis, the court found

that the defendant had not shown "any prejudice as a result of
the encounter or that the verdict was in any way tainted by the
effect of seeing him in handcuffs."
33

Id. at 70.

In another case involving shackles, Dickson v. State, the
defendant was transported to the courthouse in chains and was
seen by at least one of the prospective jurors.
1123 (Nev. 1992).

822 P.2d 1122,

During the court's examination of the

prospective jurors, this fact was discussed in front of all of
the jurors.

The court instructed the jurors not to allow the

incident to effect them.

Upon further questioning by defense

counsel, one juror stated that it would be hard to weigh the
evidence fairly due to the incident.

822 P.2d 1123.

The Dickson

court agreed that the incident infringed on the defendant's
constitutional right to appear before the jury "clad in the
apparel of an innocent person."

Id.

The court then applied a

constitutional harmless error standard and found that the error
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id.

The present case is distinguishable from Wetzel and is
factually similar to Dickson.

While the Wetzel court could find

no prejudice from the inadvertent observation of a defendant in
shackles, prejudice is much more easily shown in Mr. Bingham's
case.

Estelle long ago established the immeasurable prejudice

from a jury's observation of a defendant in prison clothes.
U.S. at 504-05.
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The jury is no less likely to be effected by

another juror's account of seeing the defendant in jail clothes
at a prior occasion or by the discussion that he was before
another court.
In Mr. Bingham's case, Ms. DeRosier, the juror who had seen
him in jail clothes, discussed her incident in front of all
34

potential jurors:
Ms. DeRosier: I just saw Mr. Bingham at like a pre-trial a
couple of weeks ago out in West Valley. I was just there in the
courtroom.
Judge Young:
Ms. DeRosier:

And are your acquainted with him in any way?
No, I just—

Judge Young: Just by coincidence you saw him, perhaps, in a
proceeding relating to this, only an earlier proceeding; is that
correct?
Ms. DeRosier: Well, I don't know whether it is related to
this case or not. It's where they go up and ask whether you're
guilty or not guilty. He had a pre-trial, (emphasis added)
Judge Young: It's probably an arraignment. And so an
earlier proceeding. It's curious to me, that among the many
people whom you would see there, why you would remember Mr.
Bingham. Can you tell us how it is that you remember one person
out of that group? Are you acquainted with Mr. Bingham?
Ms. DeRosier:
his face.
Judge Young:

H, Huh-uh.

Not at all.

No.

I just remember

You remember his face?

Ms. DeRosier: He was dressed in — I guess they kept a few
of 'em overnight in iail. (emphasis added)
Judge Young:
R. 198-200.

Uh-huh.

Following a bench conference, the trial court stated

to the entire jury venire the reason for the conference,
referring to jail clothes and stating that Mr. Bingham could have
been appearing for some other case.

R. 201-02.

Although Ms. DeRosier was excused by the court and did not
ultimately serve as a juror (R. 103), the damage was significant.
Not only did she discuss Mr. Bingham wearing jail clothes and
being held in jail for the night, but the other jurors could also
have inferred that Mr. Bingham was appearing on another charge
35

unrelated and the trial judge instructed them as much.

The trial

judge could easily have remedied the situation at the time by
dismissing the venire and calling a new pool of potential jurors.
Instead, the trial court attempted to merely instruct the jurors
that they should not consider the incident.

The instruction

actually added to the prejudice rather than dispelling it as the
trial court emphasized the fact that Mr. Bingham had been in jail
clothes, in jail and may have been appearing on a different
matter.

It was error and a violation of Mr. Bingham's rights to

a fair trial to deny the motion for mistrial.
As Mr. Bingham has shown a constitutional error, the burden
shifts to the State to show that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

This infringement on Mr. Bingham#s right to be tried with the
presumption of innocence was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Whether Mr. Bingham intended to take the vehicle only

temporarily was a close question, one that prompted questions
from the jury during deliberation.

Thus, the jury could have

been easily influenced by the prejudicial inferences to find Mr.
Bingham guilty of the receiving stolen property rather than the
lesser included offense. Mr. Bingham therefore is entitled to a
new trial.
REASONS SUPPORTING ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED DECISION
Due to the complex nature of the issues involved, including
the independent state constitutional analysis in Point I, Mr.
Bingham believes that oral argument will materially assist this
16

Court in the resolution of this Appeal, Mr. Bingham therefore
respectfully requests oral argument before this Court and
requests that a published decision be issued.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, Mr. Bingham respectfully
requests that this Court reverse his conviction for Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property and remand for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 * *

da

y

of Jul

Y ' 1995.

David V. Finlayson
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

Richard P. Mauro
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, David V. Finlayson, hereby certify that I have
caused eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah
Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
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day of July, 1995.

David^VT Finlayson
DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of July, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A

AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
project did not unconstitutionally grant benefits to private individuals; any benefits were
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-

Art. I, § 24

mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 37 CJ.S. Franchises § 26.
Key Numbers. — Franchises «=> 11.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises
§ 9 to 23.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-

vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec.
26.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Age of majority.
Agent for service of process.
Automobile license law.
Construction with Art. VI, § 26.
Contract carrier permit.
Cosmetologists' license law.
Criminal actions.
—Investigations.
—Prosecution.
—Sentence.
Criminal sentence.
Disparate tax assessments.
Excess revenue refunds.
Guest statutes.
Inheritance Tax Law.
Insurance premium tax exemption.
Intoxicating liquor.
Licenses.
Massage parlor ordinance.
Municipal employment prerequisites.
Notice requirements.
Property.
—Responsibility for water service.
Public employees' retirement system.
Public officers' bonds.
Public officers' salaries.
Road poll tax.
School activities.
Search warrants.
Sunday closing laws.
Tax sales.
Unfair Practices Act.
In general.
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever
uniform laws can be enacted. State v.
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R.
696 (1921).
Objects and purposes of law present touchstone for determining proper and improper

classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78
P.2d 920,117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. &
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766
(1941).
One who assails legislative classification as
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such.
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so
long as there is some basis for differentiation
between classes or subject matters included, as
compared to those excluded, provided differentiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Before legislative enactment can be interfered with, court must be able to say that there
is no fair reason for the law that would not
require equally its extension to those which it
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Only where some persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are, as to the subject matter of the law, in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation, is the law
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis
to differentiate can be found, law must be held
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Inability of legislature to make perfect classification does not render statute unconstitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100
Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
In determining whether classification made
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimination is very essence of classification and is not
objectionable unless founded upon unreasonable distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City,
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948).
An act is never unconstitutional because of
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41-la-1310

MOTOR VEHICLES

(2) attempt to manipulate any of the levers, starting mechanism,
brakes, or other mechanism or device of a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer while the same is at rest and unattended; or
(3) set in motion any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer while the
same is at rest and unattended.
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 117; C. 1943,
57-3a-118; 1991, ch. 241, § 44; C. 1953,
41-1-114; renumbered by L. 1992, ch. 1,
§ 166.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "class
C" before "misdemeanor" at the end of the section.

The 1992 amendment, effective January 30,
1992, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as § 41-1-114; inserted the subsection designations; substituted "motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer" for "vehicle" in three
places; and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Burglary, breaking, or entering of
motor vehicle, 72 A.L.R.4th 710.

41-la-1310. Class B misdemeanors.
It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to:
(1) fail to properly endorse and deliver a valid certificate of title to a
vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor to a transferee or owner lawfully entitled to it in accordance with Section 41-la-702, except as provided for
under Sections 41-3-301, 41-la-519, and 41-la-709;
(2) fail to give an odometer disclosure statement to the transferee as
required by Section 41-la-902;
(3) operate, or cause to be operated, a motor vehicle knowing that the
odometer is disconnected or nonfunctional, except while moving the motor vehicle to a place of repair;
(4) offer for sale, sell, use, or install on any part of a motor vehicle or on
an odometer in a motor vehicle any device that causes the odometer to
register miles or kilometers other than the true miles or kilometers
driven as registered by the odometer within the manufacturer's designed
tolerance;
(5) fail to adjust an odometer or affix a notice as required by Section
41-la-906 regarding the adjustment;
(6) remove, alter, or cause to be removed or altered any notice of adjustment affixed to a motor vehicle as required by Section 41-la-906;
(7) fail to record the odometer reading on the certificate of title at the
time of transfer; or
(8) accept or give an incomplete odometer statement when an odometer
statement is-jrequired under Section 41-la-902.
History: C. 1953, 41-1-173, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 103, § 7; 1989, ch. 274, § 41; 1990,
ch. 219, § 15; 1991, ch. 241, § 50; renumbered by L. 1992, ch. 1, § 167; 1992, ch. 218,
§ 37.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted
"second degree" for "third degree" in Subsec-

tion (2) and inserted "replace" and "replaced"
in Subsections (2)(a) and (b).
The 1 9 9 0 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, deleted "mileage" before "disclosure" in
Subsection (l)(a); substituted "miles or kilometers" for "mileage" in two places in Subsection
(l)(c); substituted "odometer reading" for
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
Unloaded
firearm.
Aggravated robbery may be committed with
an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner, 572 R2d
387 (Utah 1977).
^
j . «. .
rv_.. „ 1 f t « „ J n , 0 /TT. u
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1985); State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246 (Utah
1985); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295 (Utah

76-6-401

1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah
1986); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah
1988); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819 (1989);
State v. Russell, 791 R2d 188 (Utah 1990);
State v. Severance, 828 P.2d 1066 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d U4 (Utah Ct.
A*J; l Q Q 9 .'
App
* 1WW"

1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3.
CJJS. — 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 27.
AJLR. — Fact that gun was unloaded as
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th
507.

Admissibility of expert opinion stating
whether a particular knife was, or could have
been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th
660.
Key Numbers. — Robbery «=» l l .

PART 4
THEFT
76-6-401. Definitions,
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds,
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) lb withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) Tb restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) Tb dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee,
and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
I9l
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76-6-401

(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe
to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his
judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without
disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien,
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not
a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however,
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-401.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
of deception. State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1992).

ANALYSIS

Deception.
Purpose to deprive.
Cited.
Deception.
Subsection (a) in the definition of "deception"
only applies to impressions of fact that are false
at some present time; unfulfilled promises of
future performance do not suffice as false representations under that subsection. State v.
Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
Under Subsection (b) in the definition of
"deception," the previously created or confirmed
impression of fact must be false when the
property is obtained in order to constitute "deception." State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah
1983).
Under Subsection (e) in the definition of
"deception," a promise of future performance
can constitute deception when the promising
party does not intend to perform or knows the
promise will not be performed; a person knows
that a promise will not be performed when he is
aware that the promise is reasonably certain
not to be performed. State v. Lakey, 659 R2d
1061 (Utah 1983).
Defendant's false representations to a bank
employee about his account and line of credit at
other banks were sufficient to support finding

Purpose to deprive.
Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's intent to deprive owner of his automobile
where defendant drove the automobile in excess of 100 miles per hour when fleeing from
police; told police when stopped that he owned
the automobile; damaged the automobile by
misuse; and drove the car from Utah to California without ever stating he would return the
automobile to Utah. State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d
880 (Utah 1978).
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was
inferred from the following facts: in 1984, defendant began borrowing small amounts of
money from the victim to buy pet food; the
victim's generosity prompted defendant to
make subsequent requests for larger sums to
pay for everything from automobile repairs to
medical bills; with each request, defendant inevitably promised to repay the victim soon or by
a specific date; and between 1984 and 1986,
defendant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid
only about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Cited in Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F.
Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1986).
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76-6-408

CRIMINAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. JUT. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny
§ 101.

C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 18.
Key Numbers. — Larceny <=» 10.

76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the
case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a
separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the
receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed,
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable
value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought,
received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as
defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on
the security of the property;
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(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.
tory language, inserted "picture" in Subsection
(2)(dXiii), redesignated former Subsections
(2)(d)(i) and (ii) as Subsections (3) and (4),
inserted Subsection (5), making a corresponding designation change, and made stylistic
changes.
Cross-References. — Pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers, § 11-6-1 et seq.

History: C. 1953, 76-6-408, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-408; 1979, ch. 71, § 1;
1993, ch. 102, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted "Subsection" for "paragraph* in Subsection (2), subdivided Subsection (2Xd), moved "if the value
given for the property exceeds $20" which was
formerly in Subsection (2XdXi) to the introduc-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
stolen; (2) the defendant aided in concealing
this property; (3) at the time he so aided in
concealing it he knew the item had been stolen;
and (4) his purpose in acting was to deprive the
owner thereof of possession. State v. Lamm, 606
P.2d 229 (Utah 1980).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Applicability.
Elements.
—Concealing stolen property.
—Receiving stolen property.
Entrapment.
Evidence.
Intent.
Prima facie case.
Separate offenses.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The presumption created in Subsection (2) is
constitutional when read in light of § 76-1-503,
which provides that a presumption means only
that the issue of the presumed fact must be
submitted to the jury unless its existence is
clearly negated and that the jury may treat
proof of the underlying facts as evidence of the
presumed fact, but does not disturb the requirement that the presumed fact, like all other
elements of the crime, must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Mullins, 549 P.2d 454
(Utah 1976).
The phrase "believing that it probably has
been stolen" in Subsection (1), while not a
model of draftsmanship, is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah
1976).
Applicability.
The plain meaning of Subsection (2Xd) limits
its application to pawnbrokers and similar
businesses that generally deal in small purchases of secondhand consumer goods. It does
not include businesses that regularly deal in
large bulk orders of raw industrial material.
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah
1993).
Elements.
—Concealing stolen property.
The elements in the crime of concealing or
aiding in the concealment of stolen property
are: (1) property belonging to another has been

—Receiving stolen property.
Elements of the crime of receiving stolen
property are: property belonging to another has
been stolen; the defendant received, retained or
disposed of the stolen property; at the time of
receiving, retaining or disposing of the property
the defendant knew or believed the property
was stolen; and the defendant acted purposely
to deprive the owner of the possession of the
property. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah
1980).
Time of the alleged offense is not an essential
element of the crime of receiving stolen property; state's proof that offense occurred on a
date different than that alleged in the information was not fatal to defendant's conviction for
receiving stolen property where the applicable
limitations statute had not run at the time the
charge was filed. State v. Wilson, 642 R2d 394
(Utah 1982).
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by
receiving, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) The defendant received, retained, or disposed of the property of another, (2) knowing
that the property had been stolen or believing
that it probably had been stolen, (3) with the
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. State v.
Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986).
Entrapment.
Trial court properly found entrapment in a
"sting" operation involving use of an attractive
female undercover police officer to sell stolen
merchandise to a jewelry store owner who may
have been encouraged to suggest that his relationship with the officer become more intimate.
State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987).
Evidence.
Evidence establishing receiving stolen prop-
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